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A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR SPERINO'S
RETALIA TION AND THE UNREASONABLE JUDGE
Alex B. Long*
INTRODUCTION

I'm about to relate a story, and I promise it's true. I recently met
with an employee who had a problem at work. The employee was
thinking about raising an issue of possible discrimination with the
employer. The employee was well within the employee's rights under
federal law to raise the issue. But the employee feared that if the
employee did so, the employer might respond by, among other things,
giving the employee a negative performance review. The employee then
asked me, "But that would be retaliation, right?" My first instinct was to
say "of course that would be retaliation!" But in the back of my mind, I
knew that might not be right, so I hedged. I think I said something like,
"That definitely could be retaliation. It just depends . . . ." About eight
hours later, I started reading Sandra Sperino's article, Retaliation and
the Reasonable Person,1 and felt somewhat relieved that I had resisted
my initial instinct.
As her article demonstrates, some courts are willing to hold as a
matter of law that certain employer actions-such as providing a
negative performance evaluation-that one might naturally think could
dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity are
not sufficiently serious to qualify as actionable retaliation under federal
2
law. In one sense, Sperino's article is somewhat reassuring. It was
comforting to see the results of her survey finding that most respondents
viewed certain employer actions-such as providing a negative
performance evaluation-as being likely to dissuade them from
reporting an instance of discrimination. 3 It was comforting in the sense
that the results roughly corresponded with my own sense of what might
well dissuade a reasonable employee from reporting and what types of
actions ought to be protected under federal law. But the results were
also somewhat horrifying in that they laid bare the reality that too many
courts seem to take a view of these matters that I would argue is
completely at odds with common sense and the reasons why the law
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, University of Tennessee
College of Law.
1. Sandra F. Sperino, Retaliation and the Reasonable Person, 67 FLA. L. REv. 2031
(2015).
2. Id. at 2045-51.

3. See id. at 2045 (relating results of survey showing that 80% of respondents reported
that they would not or might not report discrimination if faced with the threat of a negative
evaluation in an employment file).
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prohibits retaliation in the first place.
I think the article does a remarkable job of identifying a serious
problem with retaliation law as it has developed since the Supreme
Court's 2006 decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v.
White.4 What's more, for reasons I will explain in slightly more detail
later, I think Professor Sperino's proposed solution-that courts define
actionable retaliation in terms of an action that is more than de minimis
in nature 5-is
not only workable, but one that I can actually envision a
court adopting. Ultimately, the article raised two issues for me: (1) why
are so many courts so apparently misguided when it comes to
determining what might dissuade a reasonable employee from
complaining about discrimination and (2) how might a court actually go
about adopting Professor Sperino's proposed solution?
I. WHY ARE COURTS SO MISGUIDED?

As Professor Sperino's article demonstrates, many courts seem to
drastically overestimate what it takes to deter employees from opposing
unlawful discrimination or from participating in a legal process
concerning unlawful discrimination. Sperino offers as one explanation
for this behavior the tendency of courts to substitute reliance on prior
cases for actual independent analysis. 6 Sperino (correctly, I think)
suggests that many judges are not, in fact, considering what might deter
a reasonable employee from opposing unlawful discrimination. Instead,
she argues that all too often courts "perceive[] a prior decision as
determining as a matter of law that certain actions are not cognizable"
even when the decisions are not truly controlling. 8 Thus, this reliance on
"perceived precedent" effectively short circuits any inquiry into the
actual controlling legal standard of whether a particular action was
materially adverse, i.e., whether it might dissuade a reasonable
employee from engaging in protected activity. 9
I think Professor Sperino is right about this. But after reading her
article, I was left with an additional question: why? Why are courts so
quick to rely on perceived precedent in this particular context? I think
courts occasionally engage in the practice of relying on perceived
precedent in other contexts as well. But this practice among courts in
the employment retaliation context seems to be both prevalent and
perhaps part of broader trend of limiting the reach of anti-retaliation
provisions.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
Sperino, supra note 1, at 2069.
Id. at 2057.
See id. at 2063.
Id.
Id. at 2060-61.
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As Sperino's article points out, courts are limiting retaliation law in
other ways. For example, in order to be protected from retaliation for
opposing what the employee believes to be unlawful conduct, the
employee must reasonably believe that the conduct in question is
unlawful. 10 In determining what a reasonable employee might believe,
some courts expect quite a bit of employees, and in some cases almost
seem to require employees to be familiar with Title VII decisional
law.1 1 As others have noted, many retaliation plaintiffs have seen their
claims fail either because they were "unreasonable" in failing to fully
grasp the subtleties and complexities of employment discrimination law
or because they lacked strong evidence of unlawful conduct. 12 Even
where plaintiffs can establish that they engaged in protected activity,
courts have also adopted stringent causation rules that often work to bar
plaintiffs' claims. 13
In short, I don't believe this is simply a case of courts being lazy or
careless with establishing and applying precedent. Courts are making it
more difficult for retaliation plaintiffs at every step of the process. The
question to my mind is whether this is intentional and, if so, why. Why
are courts constructing legal rules that make it difficult for plaintiffs
with seemingly plausible theories to survive summary judgment?
One possibility might be that judges are frustrated and overburdened
10. See Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 337 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating
that "[a] plaintiff bringing a claim under the opposition clause of Title VII must at a minimum
have held a reasonable good faith belief at the time he opposed an employment practice that the
practice was violative of Title VII").
11. See Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker's Friend: Retaliation Against Third Partiesand
the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 955 (2007) ("In some instances,
courts appear to hold an employee to the standard of what a reasonable labor and employment
attorney would believe, rather than what a reasonable employee would believe.").
12. See Matthew W. Green, Jr., What's So ReasonableAbout Reasonableness?: Rejecting
a Case Law-CenteredApproach to Title VII's Reasonable Belief Doctrine, 62 U. KAN. L. REV.
759, 787-95 (2014) (discussing the stringent standards imposed by courts in terms of assessing
the reasonableness of an employee's belief); Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The
Failure of Title VII As a Rights-ClaimingStatute, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 913 (2008) ("Title VII
retaliation doctrine posits a complainant who has solid evidentiary support for believing that
discrimination occurred and a near-perfect understanding and acceptance of the limits of current
discrimination law.").
13. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013) (holding that
Title VII retaliation cases require "but-for" causation rather than the lessened substantial or
motivating factor standards); Montgomery v. Bd. of Trustees, No. 2:12-CV-2148-WMA, 2015
WL 1893471, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 2015) ("Post-Nassar,causation based only upon close
temporal proximity has lost its sway."); see also Sauzek v. Exxon Cola USA, Inc., 202 F.3d
913, 918 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Speculation based on suspicious timing alone ... does not support a
reasonable inference of retaliation."); Marx v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 418 S.W.3d 626, 635 (Tex.
App. 2009) ("[E]ven under the but for causation standard applicable to Title VII retaliation
cases, the mere temporal proximity between protected conduct and adverse action is insufficient
to show a causal link.").
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by the dramatic increase in the number of retaliation claims in recent
years and are trying to reduce the number of such claims. 14 Another
related explanation is that some judges-who enjoy life tenure and are
long since removed from the kinds of workplaces most Americans find
themselves in-simply tend to overestimate the willingness of the
average person to stand up to discrimination and underestimate the
extent to which many employees are unable or unwilling to risk adverse
consequences at work, up to and including losing their jobs; perceived
precedent simply provides a vehicle for effectuating these judicial
attitudes. Finally, it may be that many of the retaliatory actions that,
according to some courts, do not rise to the level of materially adverse
actions involve the kinds of day-to-day discretionary actions on the part
of employers that courts are loathe to second guess. Drafting negative
evaluations, making changes to an employee's shift, and moving an
employee to a different office are the types of bread-and-butter
decisions employers make on a daily basis. Judges may simply be
especially reluctant to intrude upon this type of employer decision
making.
Whatever the full explanation may be, I think we are experiencing a
judicial backlash to the increase in retaliation claims. The issue that
Professor Sperino's article identifies is just one example of that
problem. And it is a problem that I hope to explore in more detail in the
future.
II. ADOPTING PROFESSOR SPERINO'S SOLUTION

Professor Sperino suggests that courts define actionable retaliation in
terms of an action that is more than de minimis in nature. 15 The second
issue that the article raises for me is how, as a practical matter, a court
might adopt the de minimis standard that Professor Sperino suggests.
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White, the Supreme
Court held that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision only covers
employer action that "would have been materially adverse to a
reasonable employee or job applicant." 1 6 The Court elaborated on this
standard by explaining that "the employer's actions must be harmful to
the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination." 1 7 While most of the
subsequent focus has been on the "reasonable worker" portion of the
14. In 1997, there were a little over 18,000 individual charges of retaliation in violation of
federal statutes filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). By 2015,
that number had grown to just under 40,000. See Charge Statistics, U.S. EEOC,
https ://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited June 18, 2016).
15. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
16. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
17. Id.
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opinion, the actual substantive standard that emerges from the decision
is the "materially adverse" standard.
The Court's explanation that a retaliatory action is "materially
adverse" when it "could well dissuade a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination" 18 roughly tracks the
standard of materiality found throughout the law. For example, Black's
Law Dictionary defines the word "material" in this sense to mean "[o]f
such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a person's
decision-making." 19 This same idea appears in thousands of decisions
involving all sorts of legal issues. 20 But there are also decisions outside
of the employment context that reference a de minimis standard when
attempting to further define the concept of materiality. For example, one
court has said that to show entitlement to attorney fees in a particular
case, the party must show that it "advance[d] significant factual or legal
theories adopted by the court, thereby providing a material non de
minimis contribution to its judgment ....
Occasionally, courts define
materiality and things of a de minimis nature as roughly two sides of the
same coin; a fact is material where it is not of a de minimis nature and
22 Thus, it would not be a particular stretch for courts to
vice versa. 22
reference a de minimis standard, as Professor Sperino suggests, as they
attempt to flesh out what is meant by a "materially adverse" retaliatory
action. In short, this seems like a fairly easy fix.
CONCLUSION

Retaliation and the Reasonable Person provides courts with
potentially valuable insight into the proper way to interpret and apply
the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway v. White. In addition to providing courts with evidence as to
might might deter a reasonable employee from opposing unlawful
discrimination, Professor Sperino offers a logical and practical way of
18. Id.
19. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
20. See, e.g., State v. Goodwin, 129 A.3d 316, 322 (N.J. 2016) (quoting Black's Law
definition).
21. Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. A Free Pregnancy Ctr., 229 Cal. App. 3d 633,
642 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added).
22. See Summers v. Fortner, 267 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) ("[T]he presence

of a relatively de minimis, or non-material, void component in the plea agreement may not
justify availing the petitioner an opportunity to withdraw his plea agreement."); DeMarie v.
Neff, No. Civ.A.2077-S, 2005 WL 89403, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 12, 2005) (" [A]lthough a material

breach excuses performance of a contract, a nonmaterial - or de minimis - breach will not allow
the non-breaching party to avoid its obligations under the contract."); Curt Ogden Equip. Co. v.
Murphy Leasing Co., 895 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) ("If the breach ...

is de

minimis, the trial court may determine that the breach does not destroy the purpose or the value
of the contract and is not material as a matter of law.").

2016]
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defining what should qualify as actionable retaliation.
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